Maryland Law Review
Volume 73 | Issue 1

Article 9

Passive-Aggressive Executive Power
Corinna Barrett Lain

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
Recommended Citation
Corinna B. Lain, Passive-Aggressive Executive Power, 73 Md. L. Rev. 227 (2013)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol73/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE EXECUTIVE POWER
CORINNA BARRETT LAIN ∗
My contribution to the 2013 Constitutional Law Schmooze poses a
question about the downside of executive power, at least in the enforcement
context. If executive power to enforce the law presupposes the duty to use
it, 1 what happens when the executive branch would rather not?
Perhaps reframing the question will help. What do the death penalty,
driving violations, drugs, deportation, and the Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”) 2 have in common, besides the letter “d”? The answer is
passive-aggressive executive power, and in the brief discussion that
follows, I use these five factual contexts to illustrate five variations of what
I mean.
When those charged with enforcing the law would prefer not to, what
they do is not so different from what the rest of us do when pushed. At
least five passive-aggressive responses easily come to mind—and at the
outset, I set aside the “Just say no” response, which is an exercise of
executive power but is not in the passive-aggressive category (because it is
just plain aggressive). 3 Here are the five responses: (1) do nothing, and
hope nobody notices; (2) do something silly, and make a mockery of the
whole enterprise; (3) say that you would do something, but you are too
busy; (4) say that you would do something, but you are not competent; and
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Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, University of Richmond
School of Law. Special thanks to Kevin Walsh and Wendy Perdue for schmoozing with me about
the Schmooze, Jim Gibson for comments on a previous draft, and Christina Crawford for her
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1. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .”).
2. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub.L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. §§ 7
and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)).
3. See J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 54 (1971) (“Eisenhower’s policy seemed to have been: ‘Thurgood
Marshall got his decision, now let him enforce it.’”); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change,
and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 131 (1994) (“Moreover, in 1956 Eisenhower on
more than one occasion refused to involve the federal government when mob protests and state
obstructionism blocked the implementation of school desegregation orders.”); see also ROBERT V.
REMINI, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 216 (1988) (discussing President Jackson’s famous, but
perhaps historically inaccurate, quote in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Worchester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!”).
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(5) say, in a moment of rare clarity and self-awareness, “Fine, I’ll do it, but
let’s just be clear—I don’t want to.” 4
In the discussion that follows, I first flush out these responses with my
five examples—the death penalty, driving violations, drugs, deportation,
and DOMA. I then offer some normative thoughts about each of these
responses using the standard of a reasonably prudent thirteen-year-old 5 and
parallel institutional considerations in the realm of executive power.
I. SAMPLING PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE EXECUTIVE POWER
A. The Death Penalty
In states that have the death penalty, the governor typically stands as
the last stop between a condemned inmate and his or her death.6 In most
states, this last stop takes the form of a clemency petition from the
condemned inmate, but in some states, it takes the form of an application by
the state for a death warrant instead.7 Either way, the state governor makes
the call, wielding executive power to prevent executions (by commuting
them to life sentences, granting pardons, and the like) or to order that
executions be carried out (by issuing death warrants, denying clemency
petitions, and the like). The point is that state governors have to go one
way or the other. When petitions are on their desk, they have to decide—or
do they?
Consider Florida’s death penalty in 20118—a great example of the “do
nothing, and hope nobody notices” strand of passive-aggressive executive
power. Florida has the second largest death row in the nation, with over
four hundred condemned inmates awaiting execution. 9 In April 2011,
forty-seven of those inmates—slightly over ten percent—had exhausted all
4. This response is sometimes followed by “and I think it’s unfair.”
5. I credit Julia Rose Lain for inspiring the analogy of a reasonably prudent 13-year-old,
with thanks for refraining from many of the passive-aggressive responses I discuss in this essay.
6. This assumes that all judicial remedies have been exhausted. By governor, I mean
governor or clemency board, also a part of the state executive branch.
7. In Florida, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, the governor must sign a death warrant to
commence an execution. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.052; N.H. REV. STATE. ANN. § 630:5;
Pennsylvania Readies First Non-Volunteer Execution Since 1978, Defendant Killed Sexual
Abusers, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/pennsylvania-readiesfirst-non-volunteer-execution-1978-defendant-killed-sexual-abusers (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
8. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.052 (effective July 4, 2000 through June 30, 2013).
9. See Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last visited
Sept. 24, 2013) (showing 413 death row inmates in Florida as of January 1, 2013, compared to
California’s 727 death row inmates).
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appeals and were waiting for just one thing: the governor’s signature on
their death warrant. 10 Nearly twenty of Florida’s death row inmates have
been awaiting execution for at least thirty years.11
What’s the hitch? Florida Governor Rick Scott had just started his
term in January 2011,12 so although the press faulted him for the backlog, 13
he had little to do with it (as he has subsequently made clear by signing at
least six death warrants since 2011). 14 But Governor Charlie Crist, who
preceded Governor Scott, had signed just six death warrants during his
entire four-year term—a marked difference from the twenty-four death
warrants that Governor Jeb Bush signed during his tenure as governor. 15
Indeed, under Governor Crist, more people on Florida’s death row died of
natural causes than died of executions—around three times as many. 16
Why did Crist not sign more warrants? The short answer (and key
point, for the purposes of this discussion) is that he did not want to, but for
those who want the longer version, a number of explanations come to mind.
One blogger writing about Florida’s lag time on death row surmised, “Crist
was running for U.S. Senate and didn’t want bad publicity in the press like
Texas Governor Perry receives.” 17 Other explanations may have been in
10. See Aaron Sharockman, Some 40 Death Row Inmates Awaiting Death Warrant from
Governor, Democrat Claims, POLITIFACT.COM (Apr. 20, 2011, 10:05 AM),
http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2011/apr/20/geraldine-thompson/some-40-deathrow-inmates-awaiting-death-warrant-g/.
11. See Douglas A. Berman, Just Why Are the “Waits” on Florida’s Death Row So Long?,
SENT’G L. & POL’Y BLOG (Feb. 13, 2012, 11:42 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2012/02/just-why-are-the-waits-on-floridas-death-row-so-long.html
(noting that nineteen people on Florida’s death row had been waiting for execution longer than
thirty-one years); Sharockman, supra note 10 (discussing the case of sixty-four-year-old death row
inmate Gary Alvord, who had been awaiting execution for thirty-seven years).
12. See List of Florida State Governors, THEUS50, http://www.theus50.com/
florida/governors.php.
13. See Sharockman, supra note 10 (noting that, as of April 2011, Governor Scott “ha[d] yet
to sign a death warrant since taking office”).
14. Id.; Supreme Court Denies Last Appeal by Manuel Pardo. Cop Turned Executioner
Scheduled to Die Dec. 11, FLAGLERLIVE.COM (Dec. 6, 2012), http://flaglerlive.com/46202/
manuel-pardo-execution/; Scott Signs Death Warrant in the Killing of a Florida State Trooper,
THELEDGER.COM, Jan. 19, 2013, http://www.theledger.com/article/20130119/NEWS/
130119263.
15. Sharockman, supra note 10. In fairness, Governor Jeb Bush served for two terms, so
those twenty-four warrants were signed over eight years, not four. See Jeb Bush, BIO.
http://www.biography.com/people/jeb-bush-201294 (last visited Sept. 25, 2013). Still, Governor
Bush’s rate was twice that of Governor Crist’s rate (whether that is a good thing or bad is a
different question). See Sharockman, supra note 10.
16. See Berman, supra note 11 (noting that only five people were actually executed under
Governor Crist, while fifteen died of natural causes).
17. See id. (describing the effect of bad publicity on political aspirations).
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play as well. The phenomenon of death row exonerations may have made
Crist nervous; with twenty-four on record, Florida has the dubious
distinction of having more exonerations than any other state. 18 The
prospect of triggering another round of post-conviction challenges might
have curbed his enthusiasm too. 19 It is also possible that the so-called
“Marshall Hypothesis” 20 was at work—as empirical evidence has shown,
the more people know about the death penalty, the less they like it and more
disturbing it becomes. 21
But who wanted to rush those executions anyway? Not the inmates
who were the subject of the pending death warrants, or the correctional
officers responsible for carrying them out. 22 One blogger questioned
“whether anyone really cares all that much about how slow this march has
come to be,” 23 and the point is a valid one. I am guessing victims care (at
least some of them), and perhaps state attorneys general care too. But there
is no deadline for these sorts of petitions, and the process is notoriously
secretive, so there is only so much anyone can do. 24 That is why Florida’s
death penalty under Governor Crist is a nice example of the “do nothing
and hope nobody notices” strand of passive-aggressive executive power.
Outside Florida, it is hard to say how many governors are taking a
passive-aggressive approach to executions in their state. Clearly not in this
category is the governor of Texas, who has had no problem executing the

18. See Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Feb. 11, 2013)
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty#inn-st (listing Florida’s death row
exonerations as of December 26, 2012).
19. See Berman, supra note 11 (“[Attorneys] file whatever they can for as long as they can to
keep their cases alive in the courts. New issues based on recent court rulings and changes in the
law provide new fodder for appeals all the time . . . .”).
20. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 370 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Assuming
knowledge of all the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, the average citizen
would, in my opinion, find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice.”).
21. See, e.g., Austin Sarat and Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the
Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 171 (demonstrating
empirical research in support of the Marshall Hypothesis).
22. See, e.g., Law Enforcement Endorsements, SAFE CALIFORNIA,
http://www.safecalifornia.org/about/law-enforcement-endorsements (last visited Sept. 26, 2013)
(indicating one-hundred-fifty law enforcement endorsements to abolish the death penalty in
California, including twenty-four correctional, parole, and probation officers).
23. Berman, supra note 11.
24. See Sarah Lundy, Only Florida’s Governors Can Say How They Pick Execution Order,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 19, 2009, http://www.fadp.org/news/2009052003/ (discussing secrecy
and lack of accountability in death warrant process).
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law (or people). 25 Also not in this category is Oregon’s governor, who, on
the other side of the spectrum, has had no problem publicly denouncing the
death penalty in his state and issuing reprieves. 26 (Indeed, the latest from
Oregon is a lawsuit over whether death row inmates can refuse to accept
them.) 27 But California may be in this category, as well as other
nonexecuting states with people lingering on death row. 28
California has the largest death row in the country, with over seven
hundred death row inmates awaiting execution.29 Like Florida, more of
California’s death row inmates are dying from other causes than from
executions. 30 Of the ninety-eight people who have died on California’s
death row in the modern death penalty era, thirteen died by execution, fiftyeight by natural causes, twenty-two by suicide, and six by causes
categorized as “other.” 31 Although challenges to California’s lethal

25. With 502 executions since 1976, Texas is the clear leader among the states; Virginia is
second highest with 110 executions. See Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-andregion-1976 (last visited July 26, 2013).
26. Oregon’s governor is an example of the Marshall Hypothesis in action. See supra notes
20–21 and accompanying text (explaining Marshall Hypothesis). Apparently, Governor John
Kitzhaber was “haunted” by two executions during his first term of office, leading him to believe
that Oregon’s death penalty is “‘compromised and inequitable.’” Oregon Death Row Inmate
July
24,
2012,
Fighting
Reprieve
From
Governor,
FOXNEWS.COM,
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/07/24/oregon-death-row-inmate-fighting-reprieve-fromgovernor/print [hereinafter Oregon Death Row Inmate].
27. See Oregon Death Row Inmate, supra note 26. The death row inmate claimed that “[a]
reprieve is not effective until accepted by the recipient” and that he wanted “to speed his
punishment in protest of a criminal justice system that he says is broken.” Id. In the end, the
judge ruled that the inmate had a right to reject the reprieve, while noting he agreed “with many of
the concerns expressed by the governor.” Lynne Terry, Gary Haugen Can Reject Gov.
Kitzhaber’s
Reprieve,
Judge
Rules,
OREGONIAN,
Aug.
3,
2012,
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2012/08/
gary_haugen_can_reject_gov_kit.html.
28. See Jurisdictions with No Recent Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/jurisdictions-no-recent-executions (last visited July 26, 2013)
(showing twenty-six jurisdictions with no executions in the last ten years and thirty-three
jurisdictions with no executions in the last five years). It is important to note, however, that death
row inmates may not be executed for a number of reasons, including mental health issues and new
legal challenges based on changes in the law. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
29. See Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 9 (noting California’s 727 inmates on death
row).
30. Compare Jurisdictions with No Recent Executions, supra note 28, with Death Row
Inmates by State, supra note 9.
31. See Condemned Inmates Who Have Died Since 1978, CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/docs/
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injection protocol almost certainly account for the state’s lack of executions
over the last several years, 32 they do not account for the state’s lack of
executions over the previous twenty.
What we are seeing is the same basic phenomenon that Mark Graber
wrote about in his path-breaking work on legislative deferrals.33 When
legislators find it too costly to take a stand one way or the other, the stand
they most prefer to take is no stand at all.34 Similarly, when chief
executives do not want to say “yes” to executions, but cannot afford to say
“no,” they do nothing and hope nobody notices. It is the same basic
response, but it is not legislative deferral—it is passive-aggressive
executive power.
B. Driving Violations
The example of driving violations is a tad off-point because it
concerns a state’s passive-aggressive enforcement of a federal mandate, and
thus is not purely an exercise of executive power (although executive power
is a part of it). But here is another beautiful example of a passiveaggressive response to enforcement obligations, and it comes from personal
experience so I had to use it. Besides, this one is just quirky enough to be
the sort of conversation starter one would hope for at an event called the
“Schmooze.”
When I was a kid growing up in Montana, my Dad used to put fivedollar bills in the glove compartment box of our car. I did not think about
what that money was for, but when I became a teenager and had my driver
license, I figured it out pretty quickly: it was to pay speeding tickets that
during the daytime amounted to an on-the-spot five-dollar fine. Crazy,
right? Here is the backstory.
Before 1974, and for a brief period of time after 1995, 35 Montana’s
highway speed limit signs looked like this:
CONDEMNEDINMATESWHOHAVEDIEDSINCE1978.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). I
presume that “other” includes various forms of homicide, such as being “shot on [detention
facility] Exercise Yard.” Id.
32. For a discussion of California’s problems with lethal injection over the last several years,
see Corinna Barrett Lain, The Virtues of Thinking Small, 67 MIAMI L. REV. 397, 405 (2013).
33. See generally Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to
the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36 (1993) (discussing the inaccurate understandings of
the relationship between independent judicial policymaking and the judiciary system).
34. Id. at 53–61.
35. In 1998, the Montana Supreme Court struck down the state’s “reasonable and prudent”
speed limit as too vague to give drivers notice as to what was prohibited, violating the state’s due
process clause. See Montana v. Stanko, 974 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Mont. 1998). As one Montanan

2013]

PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE EXECUTIVE POWER

233

36

Outsiders called our roads the “Montanabahn,” 37 but those of us who
lived there knew it was mostly a matter of necessity—there were so many
miles to cover, and so few cars, that most of the time it just did not make
sense to drive slower than 80 to 90 miles per hour (“MPH”) on the
highway. 38
Then the energy crisis hit, and in 1974, Congress passed the National
Maximum Speed Law (“NMSL”), imposing a limit of 55 MPH across the
country as a fuel conservation measure. 39 (The national speed limit was
later raised to 65 MPH, and then repealed entirely in 1995.40) To coerce
tells it, “The case was brought by a plaintiff named Rudy Stanko, who was a well-known
‘Freeman’ white-supremacist nut-job who was a perennial recreational litigant who finally hit a
winner challenging the speed law.” Montana Speeding Tickets: Did They Used to Have a Flat $5
Rate and When Did It Change?, STRAIGHT DOPE (Apr. 20, 2008, 5:00 PM),
http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=464693 [hereinafter Montana Speeding
Tickets]. In 1999, the legislature set the speed limit at 65 MPH. It was later bumped to the current
75 MPH on interstates, 65 MPH on secondary roads. Montana Speed Limits, MDT, available at
http://www.mdt.mt.gov/travinfo/speed_limit.shtml.
36. Reasonable and Prudent . . . , MONTANA DAILY (Jan. 26, 2011, 8:00 AM),
http://www.dailymontana.com/2011_01_01_archive.html.
37. Montana Speed, U.S. HIGHWAYS, http://www.us-highways.com/montana/
mtspeed.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2013) (discussing Montana’s reputation amongst speed
enthusiasts as the “Montanabahn”).
38. See Timothy Egan, Speeding Is Easy (and Almost Free) in Montana, N.Y. TIMES, July
10,
1989,
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/10/us/speeding-is-easy-and-almost-free-inmontana.html (“Trying to drive the speed limit here in the Big Sky State is like trying to eat
nothing but bread crusts at a banquet. There is just so much road and so few cars, that the
temptation to put the pedal to the metal is overwhelming.”). See also infra note 44.
39. Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1046 (1974)
(codified in part at 23 U.S.C. § 658).
40. Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101
Stat. 132 (1987) (raising speed limit on rural interstate highways to 65 MPH); National Highway
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compliance, the NMSL threatened to withhold federal transportation dollars
from states that did not play along. 41 Montana played, but like other states,
was not at all happy about it (remember that Sammy Hagar song, “I can’t
drive 55!”?). 42 “The only reason we’ve got any speed limit at all is Federal
blackmail, pure and simple,” one Montanan told the press. 43 Anyone who
was anyone in Montana at the time knew about the NMSL—and hated it. 44
So what did Montana do? It did something silly, making a mockery of
the entire enterprise. The whole point of the federal speed limit was energy
conservation, so Montana decided to enforce the law with a five-dollar onthe-spot fine for “waste of a natural resource.” 45 Violations of the law did
not go on a person’s driving record and could not be used to raise insurance
rates. 46 And because there was little point in issuing such tickets—it often
took more gas to catch up with a speeding motorist than the ticket was
worth—state troopers often did not write them (although I paid one,
once). 47
Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-59, 109 Stat. 568 (granting all speed limit control to the
states).
41. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION, A CHRONOLOGY OF DATES SIGNIFICANT IN THE
BACKGROUND, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
http://ntl.bts.gov/historian/chronology.htm (last visited July 26, 2013) (“The act required that the
Department [of Transportation] approve no highway projects for states having a maximum speed
limit greater than 55 MPH.”); see also Egan, supra note 38 (“Only after Federal officials
threatened to withhold highway funds did the state enact the $5 speeding ticket.”).
42. For those who, sadly, are too young to have any idea what I am talking about, see Sammy
Hagar Vevo, Sammy Hagar—I Can’t Drive 55, YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RvV3nn_de2k.
43. Egan, supra note 38.
44. One blogger writes,
The speed limit was treated with complete derision for a couple of reasons. First,
expecting people to drive 55 on most of the state highways and interstates in Montana
is a joke. These [roads] are mostly wide open, light traffic roads, and distances between
towns is relatively far as compared to smaller states. NOBODY drives 55. Second, and
more to the point, Montana has a bit of the ‘Live Free Or Die’ spirit (with apologies for
stealing the motto of New Hampshire) and there was a lot of resentment that the Feds
would strong-arm the state into passing a law that was (a) unnecessary and (b)
unwanted.
Montana Speeding Tickets, supra note 35; see also Egan, supra note 38 (“Few laws have ever
been so despised . . . .”).
45. See Egan, supra note 38 (“Officially, a $5 speeding ticket for violating the speed limit on
Montana highways is not a moving violation, but ‘an unnecessary waste of a natural resource,’
gasoline. Moreover, the ticket cannot be cited to increase insurance rates for motorists or become
part of the permanent driving record.”).
46. Id.
47. Id. (“Under this system, the state of Montana loses $22 in labor and processing costs for
every ticket written by a state trooper, a recent study by a legislative committee found . . . .” One
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What Montana effectively said to the federal government with its fivedollar on-the-spot penalty was, “Fine, we’ll enforce your silly law because
we have to, but we’re not going to act like we mean it because we don’t.
Read between the lines, here is what we think of your law.” The federal
government gave Montana a silly law, and Montana gave the federal
government silly enforcement, making a mockery of the entire enterprise.
That is why Montana’s enforcement of the NMSL is a nice example of the
“do something silly” genre of passive-aggressive executive power.
C. Drugs (Specifically, Marijuana)
Under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 48 marijuana is
categorized as a Schedule 1 drug (along with heroin and LSD) known for
having a high potential for abuse and “no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States.” 49 As such, its cultivation, distribution, and
possession are criminally punishable under federal law. 50
Enter the states. Eighteen of them, as well as the District of Columbia,
have decriminalized medical marijuana, which is marijuana purchased
pursuant to a valid prescription and used for medicinal purposes. 51 Another
two states, Washington and Colorado, have now legalized the drug entirely
in small amounts for recreational use.52
Set aside the instinct to say that preemption doctrine resolves the
conflict. For complicated reasons that go beyond the scope of this Article,
courts are not finding preemption.53 In practice, that means there are
licensed businesses that are perfectly legitimate (and paying taxes) in

officer said, “See, I can sit here and write every car that goes by. One day I wrote 63 tickets. But
with the Tinkertoy engine I’ve got in this car, it takes me five minutes just to catch up with the
guy, and then I write a five-buck ticket. Is that worth it?”).
48. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 (2012).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012).
50. Mere possession is a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in prison and a minimum
fine of $1,000. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012). The cultivation and distribution of marijuana
generally constitute felonies punishable by up to five years in prison and a maximum fine of
$250,000. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012).
51. See TODD GARVEY, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM,
AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE
REPORT
FOR
CONGRESS,
4
(Nov.
9,
2012),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42398.pdf.
52. Id. at 4 n.22. Both states have decriminalized the possession of small amounts of
marijuana (typically less than an ounce). Id.
53. See id. at 7–14 (discussing the extent federal law preempts state medical marijuana laws).
In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to pass the
CSA, but did not address the preemption question that obviously followed. Id. at 5–6.
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twenty or so states, but that nevertheless are violating federal law. What
result?
The answer has changed over time, so for the purposes of this
discussion, I go back to 2008 and 2009. In 2008, then-Senator Barack
Obama was running for his first term as President. When asked about his
position on medical marijuana, he replied, “I’m not going to be using
Justice Department resources to try to circumvent state laws on this
issue.” 54 White House drug czar Gil Kerlikowske followed with the sound
bite, “We’re not at war with people in this country”55—and he was on to
something. Public opinion polls show that over seventy percent of those
asked support the use of marijuana for medical purposes if prescribed by a
doctor. 56
Once in office, President Obama’s Department of Justice (“DOJ”) put
its money where his mouth was. In 2009, then-Deputy Attorney General
David Ogden sent a memo to U.S. attorneys in states that authorized
medical marijuana. 57 Focusing on the “efficient and rational use of [DOJ’s]
limited investigative and prosecutorial resources,” the memo told
prosecutors that they “should not focus federal resources in [their] States on
individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with
existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.” 58 In a
statement attached to the memo, Attorney General Eric Holder reiterated
the point: “It will not be a priority to use federal resources to prosecute
patients with serious illnesses or their caregivers who are complying with
state laws on medical marijuana.” 59 The plan, he told reporters in a
question and answer session that followed, was “to go after those people
who violate both federal and state law.” 60

54. See Tim Dickinson, Obama’s War on Pot, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-20120216.
55. Id.
56. See Michael Scherer, What Is President Obama’s Problem with Medical Marijuana?,
TIME (May 3, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/05/03/what-is-president-obamas-problemwith-medical-marijuana/ (showing support for the use of medical marijuana).
57. Memorandum for Selected United States Attorneys from David W. Ogden, Deputy
Attorney General, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of
Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medicalmarijuana.pdf.
58. Id.
59. David Stout & Solomon Moore, U.S. Won’t Prosecute in States That Allow Medical
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/10/20/us/20cannabis.html.
60. AG Signals Shift in Medical Pot Policy, CBSNEWS.COM, Apr. 8, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-503767_162-4875417.html.
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In short, federal law was what it was, but enforcing this particular
federal law was not a priority given DOJ’s limited resources and the myriad
other things on its plate. It was not that DOJ was refusing to enforce the
law because of countervailing state positions and public opinion (as if it
could). 61 Nor was it the case that DOJ was telling its attorneys to simply
“ignore federal drug laws” as some congressmen claimed. 62 The point was
that DOJ had limited resources and other, more important things to do.63 It
would do something, but it was too busy.
The story would not be complete without fast forwarding to 2011,
when things really got interesting. Hardliner Michele Leonhart was
confirmed as head of the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), and shortly
thereafter, the agency issued a position paper entitled, “The DEA Position
on Marijuana” (with section headings like “The Fallacy of Marijuana for
Medicinal Use,” one need not read all sixty-three pages to get the gist). 64
Within months, DOJ wrote another memo to federal prosecutors in medical
marijuana states, this time stating, “Persons who are in the business of
cultivating, selling or distributing marijuana, and those who knowingly
facilitate such activities, are in violation of the Controlled Substances Act,
regardless of state law . . . such persons are subject to federal enforcement
action, including potential prosecution.” 65 A series of federal drug raids on
state-licensed medical marijuana dispensaries soon followed, along with
threats to prosecute those who owned, operated, or otherwise associated
with them. 66

61. See 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (2012) (“[E]ach United States attorney, within his district, shall[]
prosecute for all offenses against the United States . . . .”); see also supra note 1 (noting executive
branch’s constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”).
62. See Stout & Moore, supra note 59 (noting that Representative Lamar Smith, senior
Republican on the House Judiciary Committee, believed DOJ “would weaken federal enforcement
of drug laws”).
63. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 126–27 (1979) (recognizing prosecutorial
discretion).
64. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEA POSITION ON MARIJUANA (2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dea/docs/marijuana_position_2011.pdf.
65. Memorandum for United States Attorneys from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney
General, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana
for Medical Use (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf.
66. See Dickinson, supra note 54 (discussing federal crackdown and statements by DOJ
attorneys that they would “vigorously” enforce the CSA “even if such activities are permitted
under state law”); see also William Yardley, New Federal Crackdown Confounds States That
Allow Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2011, at A13. Most disturbing are the threats to
prosecute the hundreds of state and local employees associated with licensing and regulating stateapproved medical marijuana producers. See infra note 68.
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The state of affairs now is massive confusion. While the Obama
Administration maintains that its stance has been “clear and consistent” all
along, 67 White House drug czar Gil Kerikowske has recently acknowledged
that the Administration “has not done a particularly good job” of
articulating its drug policy, 68 and legislators on both sides of the aisle have
written an open letter calling upon the federal government to provide
“clarity rather than chaos.” 69 For his part, Attorney General Holder
clarified DOJ’s position as follows: “If in fact people are not using the
policy decision that we have made to use marijuana in a way that’s not
consistent with the state statute, we will not use our limited resources in that
way.” 70 Um, yeah, that clears up a lot.
Meanwhile, the uncertainty has started to play out in court. In late
2012, the City of Oakland filed suit against the federal government for
seizing an Oakland building occupied by a registered and permitted medical
marijuana dispensary, 71 claiming in part that DOJ’s policy statements and
prior pattern of nonenforcement against state-authorized dispensaries barred
its seizure of the dispensaries under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.72 A
federal magistrate recently dismissed the suit, but the same arguments are
being made in the parallel forfeiture action.73 Meanwhile, over a dozen

67. Dickinson, supra note 54.
68. See Carly Schwartz, Capital City Care, D.C.’s First Medical Marijuana Dispensary,
Slated to Open in April, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 15, 2013, 12:25 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/15/capital-city-care_n_2696193.html. The issue is about
to get really interesting, as the District of Columbia’s first medical marijuana dispensary just got
its license and is about to be open for business. See Arin Greenwood, Capital City Care, D.C.
Medical Marijuana Dispensary, Receives License, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 23, 2013, 6:19 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/23/capital-city-care-dispensary-license_n_3141747.html.
69. Lucia Graves, Lawmakers in 5 States Tell Feds to Back off Medical Marijuana,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2, 2012, 4:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/04/02/lawmakers-in-5-states-tell-feds-medical-marijuana_n_1397811.html.
70. Scherer, supra note 56.
71. See Press Release, Office of the City Attorney, Oakland City Attorney and Morrison &
Foerster Sue Federal Government to Prevent Seizure of Building Used by Medical Cannabis
(Oct.
10,
2012),
available
at
Dispensary
http://www.oaklandcityattorney.org/News/Press%20releases/Fed%20complaint%20med%20cann
abis%20Oct%2010%202012.html; Nicole Flatow, Oakland Sues Federal Prosecutors over
Medical
Marijuana
Crackdown,
THINK
PROGRESS
(Oct.
11,
2012),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/10/11/993261/oakland-sues-federal-prosecutors-overmedical-marijuana-crackdown/?mobile=nc.
72. Complaint at ¶¶ 1–3, City of Oakland v. Holder, No. sf-3201156, (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10,
2012).
73. See Judge Rules Against Oakland in Medical Marijuana Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2013,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2013/02/judge-rules-against-oakland-in-medicalmarijuana-lawsuit.html.
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Congressmen have since weighed in with a proposed federal statute to
protect state medical marijuana dispensaries and the patients they serve.74
Maybe what we are seeing is passive-aggressive enforcement of an
earlier passive-aggressive decision not to enforce. Regardless, DOJ’s
earlier approach to (non)enforcement of the CSA in the context of medical
marijuana exemplifies what we all do when we do not want to do
something, but feel pushed to do it anyway—we say we would do it, but we
are too busy with other more important things to do.
D. Deportation
This next illustration of passive-aggressive executive power could be
called deportation or “denying visas”—either way, it exemplifies the “I
would, but I am not competent” approach to passive-aggressive executive
power. To see what I mean, one need only think back to the exclusion of
homosexuals from the United States in the 1970s, and how a different
government posture came to be.75
Back in the 1950s and 1960s, Section 212 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act defined the class of aliens who were inadmissible to the
United States as including “[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality,
sexual deviation, or a mental defect.” 76 In 1967, the Supreme Court
construed the phrase “psychopathic personality” in Section 212 to include
Throughout most of the 1970s, the Immigration
homosexuals. 77
Naturalization Service (“INS”) enforced Section 212 by referring suspected
homosexuals to an on-staff Public Health Service (“PHS”) official for a
medical examination. 78 The INS’s position was that a PHS medical
certification was necessary because the determination of homosexuality was
a matter beyond its expertise. 79
In 1979, the INS medical referral system came to an abrupt halt when
the Surgeon General of the United States issued a policy memorandum
stating that PHS medical officers would no longer certify homosexuality as

74. Id.
75. I credit Peter Shane, with sincere thanks, for this wonderful contribution at the
Schmooze.
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1970).
77. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 120 (1967) (“The legislative history of the Act indicates
beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ to
include homosexuals such as petitioner.”).
78. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1472 (1983).
79. Id. at 1477–78 (reviewing INS’s rationale for requiring medical certification).
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a mental disease or defect per se.80 According to the memo, the policy
change was made for two reasons. First, the American Psychiatric
Association’s DSM II and forthcoming DSM III (Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders) no longer included homosexuality as a
psychiatric disorder. 81 Second, homosexuality was not a determination that
could be made by a routine medical exam. 82 The Surgeon General’s
position was that just as INS had declared itself not competent to make
determinations of homosexuality, the PHS was not competent either.83
With no one claiming the competency to make a determination of
homosexuality, Section 212’s bar against homosexual aliens eventually
took care of itself. The INS first allowed suspected homosexuals to enter
the United States conditionally, deferring action on their case for the
duration of their visit 84 (which, by the way, presents another nice example
of the “do nothing, and hope nobody notices” approach discussed above). 85
The INS then adopted a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy that essentially
ignored the prohibition entirely unless an alien made an unambiguous
admission of homosexuality on his or her own. 86 When that eventuality
finally occurred, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that INS was
unable to enforce Section 212 given the certification procedure on the
books. 87 In the concluding lines of its opinion, the court wrote:
Because the PHS refuses to issue medical certificates on the basis
of homosexuality per se and because we today hold that the INS
may not exclude homosexual aliens without such certificates, it is
completely speculative that any aliens will be excluded in the
future on the basis of their homosexuality per se.88
And with that, the provision was declared dead.

80. Id. at 1472.
81. Id. at 1472 n.3 (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 1473 (citation omitted).
83. See id. at 1472–73.
84. Id. at 1473; Philip J. Hilts, Agency to Use Dormant Law to Bar Homosexuals from U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/03/us/agency-to-use-dormant-law-tobar-homosexuals-from-us.html (“When people declare themselves homosexual, an immigration
service official who spoke on the condition of anonymity said, the service simply defers action on
the case for the duration of the person’s visit.”).
85. See supra Part I.A.
86. See Hill, 714 F.2d at 1473.
87. Id. at 1481.
88. Id.
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Eventually, Section 212 was amended to formally end the exclusion of
suspected homosexuals on that basis (although not until 1990). 89 Yet even
while it was valid, both the INS and PHS rendered Section 212 a nullity by
taking the same approach to its dictates—“I would, but I’m not competent.
You will need to get somebody else.”
E. DOMA
The Obama Administration’s stance on the now invalid Section 3 of
the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) 90 is such a clear-cut example of
passive-aggressive executive power that I can get right to the point. Section
3 of DOMA codified the definition of marriage for all federal purposes as
“only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and
wife.” 91 Thus, same-sex couples were not eligible for a host of federal
benefits, such as filing joint tax returns, collecting Social Security
survivors’ benefits, and qualifying for insurance coverage as the spouse of a
government employee. 92
President Obama had long opposed DOMA in principle, and in
February 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder sent a letter to Congress
stating that both he and the President had concluded that Section 3 violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 93 As such, the letter
explained, the executive branch would no longer defend DOMA in cases
where its constitutionality was being decided against a blank slate (although
it would continue to defend the statute in other cases and, in any event,
would continue to enforce its provisions until Congress repealed them or
the judicial branch ruled them invalid). 94 Attorney General Holder also
pledged to “notify the courts of our interest in providing Congress a full and

89. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1990).
90. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684–96 (2013) (holding that DOMA’s
definition of marriage was unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected
by the Fifth Amendment).
91. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
92. See An Overview of Federal Rights and Protections Granted to Married Couples,
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/an-overview-of-federal-rightsand-protections-granted-to-married-couples (last visited Sept.29, 2013).
93. See Daniel Foster, Obama Administration Declares DOMA Unconstitutional, Won’t
Defend It in Court (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/260494/breaking-obama-administration-declares-doma-unconstitutional-wont-defend-itcourt-dani (reproducing letter to Congress).
94. See id. (noting that where courts apply rational basis review, “the Department will state
that, consistent with the position it has taken in prior cases, a reasonable argument for Section 3’s
constitutionality may be proffered under that permissive standard”).

242

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:227

fair opportunity to participate in the litigation in those cases,” 95 and indeed,
House Republicans hired a lawyer to defend the moribund statute on their
own. 96
In a roundtable discussion with reporters, President Obama explained
the rationale behind his approach, stating:
Administratively, we can’t ignore the law. DOMA is still on the
books. What we have said is even as we enforce it, we don’t
support it, we think it’s unconstitutional. The position that my
administration has taken I think will have a significant influence
on the court as it examines the constitutionality of this law. 97
As the nation’s chief executive, President Obama felt that he had to
enforce DOMA. But he clearly did not want to, and he did not see his
obligation as defending the law as well (at least when he thought it to be
unconstitutional). Indeed, President Obama explicitly recognized his
refusal to defend DOMA as a way to undermine it—a way to signal to
courts in no uncertain terms just how indefensible the Administration
thought the law was. 98 Critics called the move “an executive power
grab,” 99 but there is another (and in my mind better) name for the approach
President Obama took: passive-aggressive executive power.
II. EVALUATING PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE EXECUTIVE POWER
One might evaluate executive power from a number of different
vantage points, and plenty of law review articles have. 100 The focus of my
discussion, however, has been passive-aggressive executive power, so that
is the evaluative lens I use here. Assuming, again, that executive power to
enforce the law includes the duty to use it (so the “Just say no” option is not

95. Foster, supra note 93.
96. See Bill Mears, Boehner Hires Top Lawyer to Fight over Marriage Law, Sources Say,
CNN.COM, Apr. 19, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/04/18/
house.defense.of.marriage/index.html?iref=allsearch.
97. Press Release, The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President
in an “Open for Questions” Roundtable (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/09/28/remarks-president-open-questions-roundtable.
98. Id.
99. Devin Dwyer, Critics Call Obama DOMA Decision an Executive Power Grab, ABC
NEWS.COM, Feb. 24, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/critics-slam-obama-doma-decisionnewt-gingrich-calls/story?id=12992207.
100. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but Not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1001, 1009–11 (2012) (analyzing ‘enforce but do not defend’ using a “consequentialist
analysis in light of the full spectrum of constitutional values”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive
Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183 (2012) (analyzing ‘enforce but do not defend’
using a range of considerations deemed relevant to the analysis).
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on the table), how do the passive-aggressive responses discussed above
compare?
I start the discussion with a thought experiment: rather than talking
about executive power, what insights might we glean if we couched the
discussion in terms of a reasonably prudent thirteen-year-old instead?
Executive power is complicated, but passive-aggressive responses exist in
some pretty simple forms, and kids are a nice example. Parents impose
upon their children all sorts of obligations to do things that their children
would prefer not to do. 101 For the most part (and assuming away the
terrible twos), our children do not come right out and say “no” to those
directives. They do other things—passive-aggressive things—instead, and
they have those responses down pat by the time they are in their early teens.
So applying the standard of a reasonably prudent thirteen-year-old, how do
the responses I have discussed above fare?
First consider the “do nothing, and hope nobody notices” response. 102
What parent on this planet is okay with that? None that I know, and the
reason is not so much that the behavior is passive-aggressive, but rather
because there is a good chance it would work (that is, nobody would
notice—that is, until disaster struck). Parents are busy people. We simply
don’t have time to monitor every move our thirteen-year-olds make. That is
why when we tell them to do something, we have to have some modicum of
trust that they will actually do it, if only so that we can get on with the
myriad of other things competing for our precious time.
Second, what about the “do something silly” response, the one that
makes a mockery of the entire enterprise? 103 This one is no better, and in
many ways worse. It is the one response that infuriates us as parents
because it is all about flouting our power. This one feels disrespectful
because it is disrespectful, and nobody likes being disrespected—least of
all, parents.
Third is the “I would, but I’m too busy” response—the blow-off. 104
When it is a legitimate excuse (for example, a school project is due), then
we understand, we bend. But when what is really going on is passiveaggressive behavior, then our response tends to be more along the lines of
“Busy? I’ll show you busy” (sometimes accompanied by “and don’t you
101. The analogy is not perfect, but it captures the obligation to enforce better than most other
relationships I know. Sometimes I can get my husband to do what I say, but not if I tell him he
has to do what I say.
102. See supra Part I.A.
103. See supra Part I.B.
104. See supra Part I.C.
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give me that look”). Here again, the response feels disrespectful because it
is disrespectful—and when it comes to the blow-off, there is another danger
as well. In the parenting world, consistency is everything. The response
we get depends on the signals we send, and if we sometimes demand that
our child do a particular task and at other times don’t, our reasonably
prudent thirteen-year-old will get the signal that the task is not all that
important. We cannot get mad at our hypothetical thirteen-year-old for not
emptying the dishwasher when we have been inconsistent about insisting
that she do it in the past.
Fourth, the closely related “I would, but I am not competent”
response 105 is an empirically proven husband avoidance technique
(particularly in the realm of laundry and dishes), but one can imagine our
reasonably prudent thirteen-year-old being a quick study and trying it out as
well. Here we are dealing with a possible blow-off and a moral hazard
problem as well—why learn how to perform certain tasks when not
knowing how to perform them is the ticket out? This one is no better than
the rest, and given the adverse incentives in play, it may be worse.
That leaves only the “Fine I’ll do it but let’s be clear, I don’t want to”
response—and now we are on to something. 106 This approach is the one we
parents do not mind. After all, how many times have we praised our kids
for “using their words” rather than acting out? In the grand scheme of
things, I cannot make my thirteen-year-old want to do what I have told her
to do. But if her resistance takes the form of “Fine, I’ll do it, but for the
record, I don’t want to,” that is about as good as it is going to get. It
respects my authority. It allows for self-expression. And it paves the way
for dialogue rather than ignorance, confusion, or anger—which is what I am
left with as a result of the other passive-aggressive responses. For the
record, that is an incredibly mature thing for a thirteen-year-old (even a
reasonably prudent one) to do.
Turning now to the realm of executive power, I submit that the
institutional considerations one might employ to evaluate the various
passive-aggressive responses to enforcement obligations are not so different
from these. We do not want the executive branch to do nothing and hope
nobody notices. People are busy living their lives; they do not have time to
enforce the enforcers. We also do not want executive power being used in
ways that make a mockery of our laws. The thumb-your-nose response to
enforcement obligations is not exactly a healthy way of managing interbranch conflict or complex institutional dynamics. The “I would, but I’m
105. See supra Part I.D.
106. See supra Part I.E.
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too busy” blow-off is not much better, and in some ways is worse. It not
only shirks executive branch duties, but also sends inconsistent signals
about where, when, and how laws will be enforced—with unfair results, as
the medical marijuana context amply shows. And the “I would, but I am
not competent” response is deeply problematic for all the same reasons, and
comes with a moral hazard problem to boot.
Only the last strand of passive-aggressive executive power—the “I’ll
do it but I do not want to” response—presents an arguably acceptable
approach to unwanted executive power. It does not shirk enforcement
obligations, but it does let the other branches know exactly where the
executive stands. It is the executive branch “using its words,” paving the
way for an inter-branch dialogue that might just obviate the need for further
displays of passive-aggressive executive power. And for the record, that is
an incredibly mature thing for an executive branch (even a reasonably
prudent one) to do.

